Putin’s Bloody Gamble: Over 1 Million Russian Troops Lost as Ukraine War Costs Spiral

On June 12, Ukraine’s General Staff announced a significant milestone in the war with Russia - over one million Russian troops have been killed or wounded since the start of the full-scale invasion. The reported figure stands at 1,000,340, with 1,140 of those casualties recorded in the past 24 hours alone. The announcement was timed with Russia Day, a national holiday marking the creation of the Russian Federation following the Soviet Union’s collapse.

Ukraine’s data aligns with NATO estimates from April, which placed Russian losses around 900,000, including as many as 250,000 killed. Russia, for its part, does not publish casualty numbers, and independent verification of Ukraine’s statistics remains difficult. External analysts suggest the actual numbers may be lower. Both Kyiv and Moscow are known to use casualty figures to serve their own narratives.

In contrast, Ukraine's own death toll has also been significant. President Volodymyr Zelensky recently said over 46,000 Ukrainian soldiers have died. The independent UA Losses project puts the number of verified Ukrainian military deaths at 76,010 based on publicly available data - though the real number is likely higher due to unconfirmed and missing cases.

The symbolic one-million casualty mark draws attention not only to the scale of human loss but also to the financial and structural consequences for Russia. Despite the staggering toll, analysts say this development is unlikely to trigger a shift in Russia’s military strategy. Instead, Moscow appears to be preparing for a new wave of summer offensives while intensifying aerial attacks on Ukrainian cities.

But beneath the military posture lies a deeper vulnerability - economic sustainability. According to George Barros from the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), President Vladimir Putin miscalculated how to fund a prolonged war. Rather than resorting to Soviet-era conscription tactics, Putin built a system in which people are financially incentivized to fight. This might have worked for a short campaign. For a protracted war, it’s a different story.

Russia relies on two military structures: the conscript army and the contract army. The conscripts form the core of the standing military and are drafted twice a year, but legally cannot be deployed abroad. This legal and cultural boundary is reinforced by vocal opposition from mothers of conscripts, one of the few social groups that the Kremlin still seems to heed.

To avoid political backlash, the Kremlin leaned on contract soldiers - professional troops who sign up voluntarily. Initially, these formed the core of the invasion force. However, when the quick victory Russia had expected failed to materialize, and losses mounted, Moscow had to find a way to replace troops without resorting to a full mobilization.

The partial mobilization of September 2022 prompted rare anti-war protests inside Russia. It showed the political risk of mass conscription and forced Putin to shift toward a pay-to-fight model. According to CEPA fellow Pavel Luzin, financial recruitment has become the only viable method of replenishment. By late 2022, ideologically motivated volunteers had all but disappeared.

This financial approach has created its own problems. The Kremlin has repeatedly increased recruitment bonuses to meet enlistment targets. What began as a one-time payment of 200,000 rubles doubled in 2024 to 400,000 rubles (around ,000). But in some Russian regions, payments now reach as high as 3 million rubles (over ,000), driven by regional quotas.

To put this in perspective, the average Russian monthly wage is 0. A one-time bonus of ,000 is nearly four years’ income for the average worker. Yet the Kremlin must offer these sums to attract soldiers to a war widely seen as deadly and drawn-out. Analysts estimate that Russia loses and replaces between 35,000 and 45,000 troops each month. At ,000 per head, even without counting salaries, benefits, or death compensations, the recruitment bill alone is enormous.

Economist Janis Kluge estimates that the cost of sign-up bonuses alone is million per day. All this comes as Russia's economy is being battered by sanctions and falling revenues from energy exports. Military spending has soared to 6.3% of GDP - the highest since the Cold War - while budget deficits are climbing.

According to energy analyst Wojciech Jakóbik, to sustain the war machine, the Russian government is dipping into reserves, raising taxes, and slashing spending on social services. Without this military outlay, the Russian economy might already be in recession.

The war has become more than a battlefield struggle. It’s a financial race that may ultimately test the Kremlin’s endurance as much as its soldiers’.

Sources:

• Ukrainska Pravda
• ISW
• DPA
• The Kyiv Independent