The Bulgarian Clash of the Titans (and Acronyms), Onset

The long-anticipated move of Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov – the founding of a political formation of his own – is already materializing, setting the stage for a gigantic clash in Bulgarian politics of the groups that Parvanov and Prime Minister Boyko Borisov stand for.

Parvanov himself confirmed on Friday his intention to establish a "broad civic movement" named ABV (the Bulgarian acronym for "Alternative for Bulgarian Revival" and the first three letters of the Bulgarian alphabet, i.e. the Bulgarian "ABC"), which is clearly supposed to become a political party.

The ABV movement to be founded on November 11, 2010, is supposed to become an "alternative" of Bulgaria's center-right ruling party GERB ("Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria" whose acronym means "Coat of Arms").

It is expected to bring together: A) trusted aides of Parvanov who are at the same time said to be respected public figures – actors, professors, sportsmen; B) the leaders of a number of weird marginal political parties and formations – from pro-Russian left-wing (supposedly) intellectual circles and agrarians to nationalists, plus key figures from the Bulgarian Socialist Party that Parvanov chaired in 1997-2001, and that is currently in disrepute; V) (supposedly) successful Socialist mayors.

With that said, several key things are to be pointed out about the president's party.

First, if those seemingly diverse groups on the outside managed to be merged into a clear-cut political movement – and that is quite possible if the (economic) groups they are backed by deem that feasible – the new formation will be ideologically something like the Bulgarian communist regime in the 1970s and 1980s (all negative connotations aside!) – left-leaning but also nationalistic (at least theoretically).

Second, as far as the voters are concerned, it will not find it hard to attract a substantial number of supporters. Parvanov himself, and some of the figures that he has selected, indeed enjoy popularity with many Bulgarians. It remains to be seen if that will be enough to fulfill the President's political goals. Another important factor is that the new movement will be... new, in a way. And Bulgarian voters love new messianic players on the political stage.

Third, the names mentioned as likely to become part of the new movement, do not strike the mind with their wit for policies of the 21st century and the Global Age even though many of them are termed intellectuals. That is not to say there aren't really, really respectable and well-intentioned men and women among them but they appear to belong to an older political generation and to be much more partisan than technocratic. There is a Bulgarian saying that you can't start something new with old faces (the saying actually talks about a brothel and its "employees" - but I'll abstain from mentioning it in original because it might be considered offensive).

Fourth, it is not technically illegal for the President to start "political projects" from his position as head of state since apparently he will be the informal leader of the new formation. But it seems to be morally questionable. One does not see the presidents of other decent parliamentary republics – such as Germany or Italy, or Austria – do that kind of thing. For his last remaining year in office what will the President do exactly – "head" the state or "head" the new movement?

Fifth, building upon that, it is a common opinion among Bulgarian political analysts that President Parvanov has managed to acquire a much greater sway in Bulgarian political life than his post technically provides for. Through a combination of persistence, ingenuity, and dubious informal methods he has managed to explore certain unclear provisions of the Bulgarian Constitution and legislation to acquire more power – even if that is more "informal" and "soft". He is known to be enjoying strong ties with a whole array of important people in all kinds of spots in the Bulgarian society.

Sixth, if the new political formation works out, it will be allied, though probably more informally than anything else, with the Bulgarian Socialist Party now chaired by ex PM Sergey Stanishev. Even though Stanishev himself is not without sway, he retains the image of a kind of a figurehead or a pretty face of the Socialist Party. Thus, the ABV formation probably won't steal many votes from the already dwindled base of the BSP. It is expected to eat away at the electorate of GERB and even the outright nationalists from Ataka.

Back in 2009, Rumen Ovcharov, a deputy chair of BSP, mentioned at a party conference that the conservative party RZS (Order, Law, Justice) led by Yane Yanev, was a political engineering project of the Socialist, albeit not a very successful one. (Other reports say that the RZS party has ties with foreign intelligence services, that is, ties that are more overt and direct than the ties of other political parties in Bulgaria). All this means that Parvanov's new party will have potential political partners.

Bulgaria's local and presidential elections in 2011 will be Round One of the battle between those interest groups (and social layers, if one has to stick to the idealistic paradigm of democratic political representation) that Parvanov stands for, and those interest groups (and social layers) backing the government of Borisov and GERB. A more serious clash is going to follow after that. It is unlike that the presidential movement would seek to somehow topple the Borisov government (that is, through informal influences) since it will need time to establish itself as a credible political entity.

Compared with the Parvanov side, the Borisov team might actually have weaker positions even though it is technically in power.

It is crucial to note that Borisov's GERB is still without a clear-cut identity of its own that could help it stand on its feet without its leader. GERB barely has enough seasoned people to fill the top positions in the state administration; the mid-level management in the state institutions largely remains more attached to "older" times and structures such as the Socialists.

Meanwhile, individual GERB members and appointees appear to be disappointing the voters all the time as a certain number of people with outrightly questionable intentions appear to have found their way in the ranks of the new party in the initial scramble around its formation not so long ago.

What is more, Borisov runs a minority government, which, even though it is unlikely to be toppled, has uneasy and informal allies – the nationalists from Ataka and occasionally the right-wing Blue Coalition, and partly as a result of that, it has lacked the might needed to push really big but really unpopular reforms early in its term (and is unlikely to do so later).

While seeking to crack down on "special" interests, i.e. groups that benefit semi-legally from the state and EU funds, the government actually achieved little more than alienating key power factors and entire social groups – from doctors and students to police officers.

If the Borisov government manages to stay the course and hold the line for two more years without making any major blunders, and with actually absorbing EU funds for what they are supposed to be used - large-scale infrastructure construction, perhaps the natural course of developments will tip the scales to its favor.

By then, the recovery of the EU economy, and the switch of the Bulgarian economy from being driven by a real estate bubble and consumption to healthy export-oriented industries, which is said to have already started, might be rather advanced. Chances are that if no major disasters happen, by 2012-2013 the Bulgarian economy could show some modest but decent progress.

Borisov himself remains the major asset of his party in terms of sheer popularity; in spite of any blunders on his part, he just can't seem to lose credibility with a fair share of the Bulgarian voters. His closest aide Interior Minister Tsvetanov appears to be in a similar position.

How powerful are the respective economic interests backing the "political projects" of Borisov and Parvanov, or, rather, which one is more powerful? It is hard to say unless you are in some of their "kitchens."

What about the foreign interests? The Borisov government appears to be enjoying very good ties with the USA, the major EU states, and Israel among others, while the President is constantly rumored to have ties with "Russian oligarchs", even though that in itself means nothing as it is a standard phrase repeated all the time by Bulgarian "post-communist anti-communists".

The one thing for sure is that the political developments in Bulgaria in the next couple of years will be rather interesting. If Borisov and Parvanov even each other out, the role of the ethnic Turkish party DPS (Movement for Rights and Freedoms) of Ahmed Dogan will be that of the decisive actor tipping the scales in somebody's favor – as it was in 1992-1994.

For the time being, however, the future titans, whose clash is yet to unravel, are focusing on the fate of Aleksei Petrov, the former undercover agent known as "the Tractor" and "the Octopus", who is investigated for organized crime activities. Interestingly, both the Borisov and Parvanov camps accuse each other of having been connected with Petrov.

The bottom line, though, is that if the police general wants to stay in power longer, he will have to find a way to counter the emerging momentum of the extremely seasoned professional politician looking to flex his political muscle after gain much political weight and influence during his ten years as president.

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