Sociologist Antoniy Galabov: Bulgarians Like Boyko Borisov because of His Strong Hand and Spontaneity

Interview with Dr. Antoniy Galabov, Associate Professor of Sociology at the New Bulgarian University in Sofia, and head of the Sofia-based Pro Bono Publico research and consulting agency; Dr. Galabov is one of the most prominent analysts of Bulgarian politics and society.

 

Even though it might be early for detailed assessments, what is the balance of the GERB party's rule of Bulgaria so far?

Most of all, GERB's rule is obviously about a model of operational government which does not entail the carrying out of strategic reforms but is fully focused on active crisis management. This will not be the type of government that would generate the long expected "second wave" of modernization reforms in Bulgaria. At the same time, it seems that, at least for the time being, the government is meeting the public expectations, which in turn forms its most important political capital.

Before the last elections Bulgarians asked for a change but they did not ask for a restart of democracy and the setting up of a competitive environment for free market initiative. The public expectations for the new government are big but they have nothing to do with the extremely great expectations for immediate material well-being that brought to power the NMSP party of Simeon Saxe-Coburg in 2001.

The first actions of the GERB government are following the agenda of the public opinion. The one-party government provides for establishing a more efficient control on the various interest groups, and this may turn out to be the strategic advantage of the GERB government compared to all previous coalition governments after that of PM Anrey Lukanov in 1991.

At the same time, it will be hard to sustain in the coming months the rate at which the new executive has started work, and the legislative branch is going to form its own priorities as an extension of the governmental programs and action plans. The structure of the cabinet shows that economic development and home affairs will be the top priority spheres.

This rightist political framework will have to withstand the challenge of the increased social pressure amidst deepening crisis. This is exactly why the first actions on an anti-crisis program seek to achieve as wide agreement of the government's social partners as possible, and seek a clear support from the EU and the international institutions. This is the right approach but it will not be applicable under all circumstances. The question is when and with respect to which policies the cabinet could afford to leave the area of mass public sentiments.

Various public opinion polls in the recent weeks have shown unprecedented trust for the GERB government among the Bulgarian society. Why do you think that is? In your view, do people think they already can see some of the promised improvements?

There are at least two ways to explain the public support shown by the first polls after GERB assumed power. The first one is "reaction" - it is connected with the accrued resentment for the previous government. (In the last ten months of its term, the Stanishev cabinet had the support of only about 8% of the people). At the end of 2008, the previous ruling coalition generated a large degree of resentment, which naturally transformed itself into support for the new majority. But this support may turn out to be unsteady precisely because of its "reactive" nature.

The second explanation follows a well-established model of Bulgarian political culture. The majority of the Bulgarian citizens would like to see strong and concentrated power, if possible, with one person who is efficient in solving the problems. In this sense, GERB received the support of the voters not just as an alternative of the three-way coalition but to a much greater extent because it stands for a predictable governance model, which apparently corresponds to the public expectations.

The people expect that GERB and Boyko Borisov will establish an order in the state; punish those who tarnished Bulgaria's EU integration; espouse clear responsibility for the decisions they make; demonstrate activeness and a traditional amount of compassion for the problems of everyday life. At least for the time being, the government is meeting those expectations.

Do you believe that Prime Minister Borisov has a "superhero" image with the society - that is the way the media have presented him, including at his earlier positions as Interior Ministry Secretary and Sofia Mayor? How do Bulgarians view him beyond the high percentage of public trust? Are the expectations for him way too great, thus creating the possibility for a large scale loss of public trust?

The public image of Boyko Borisov is projected beyond his media appearances. He meets the expectations for a "strong hand", combining those features with spontaneity, which is characteristic of everyday communication. This is not an image-making trick. Over the past eight years the media have followed and provoked Borisov, constantly trying to fix him into some well known role, thus rendering his political strategy commonplace.

Not only has he managed to establish his presence but he has also maintained a healthy degree of uncertainty around his plans. His exceptional reflex for the potential public reactions in every single situation has managed to preserve his image from both idolization and profanity. This is exactly how the larger part of the Bulgarian society seems to view him - as a man of action who is not trying to look as someone that he is not; as the right person who can handle the situation.

If this public image did not correspond with Borisov's personal qualities, there would definitely be a collapse. But at least for the time being, it seems the pressure of public expectations is encouraging his will for the permanent establishing of a behavioral model corresponding with the deeper layers of Bulgarian political culture, thus securing for him a credible protection against abrupt and fatal loss of trust.

This loss could emerge in case of a breach of the balance that Borisov stands for - the balance between the strong man and the "man of the people"; between the person who can organize the actions of the others and the politician who negotiates and is ready to settle with political deals. At least for the time being, this risk seems minimal.

Why, under what circumstances, and when do you think there might be cracks and serious differences between GERB and the three smaller rightist parties supporting the government that make the three withdraw their support?

The rightist Blue Coalition, the nationalist "Ataka", and the conservative RZS ("Order, Law, Justice") have all been portrayed in a similar role which led to the idea that they are very much alike with one another. Actually, this was the first tactical mistake of GERB. With its evident desire to govern on its own, which also answered the public expectations, the ruling party had space for maneuvering in its relations with its potential partners that it did not utilize in the best possible way.

The commitment of the Blue Coalition stems from the most important political identity of the GERB party as a member of the European People's Party (of which the UDF and the DSB making up the Blue Coalition are also members - editor's note). The tactics of RZS, which started long before the election campaign, has been to become a privileged partner of GERB, trying to replace and marginalize the UDF, and especially the DSB party.

Ataka in turn cannot be defined as a rightist political force. Volen Siderov's party has in turn tried to become as close to GERB as possible offering an alternative solution to that of RZS for isolating the Blue Coalition. At the same, from a political point of view, the GERB party needs, most of all, the expertise concentrated in the parties from the Blue Coalition.

The program of the "Blues" is going to be incorporated in the program of the government but at the same time there may be fears within the GERB party which are connected with the potential influence of the more established political decisions of the "Blues". In any case, at least for the time being, there is a balance which could be preserved without the formations supporting the government losing their identity but also without them going into direct confrontation - at least during the first two years of GERB's government.

Ataka's leader Siderov has recently criticized sharply President Parvanov taking firmly Prime Minister Borisov's side, and Ataka seems to be the party supporting the government without any reserve. Should we expect that the GERB government will be able to serve its full terms thanks exactly to "Ataka's" support? What does the nationalist party win from that? (GERB has 116 MPs out of 120 needed for a majority; Ataka has 21; the Blue Coalition has 14; RZS has 10 - editor's note.)

GERB's government has all chances to serve successfully its full term. Ataka's support has more of a quantity rather than quality meaning. Ataka's expert potential is very limited and it certainly cannot make up for the negatives connected with its initial positioning especially with regard to GERB's EU partners.

Volen Siderov's criticism for President Georgi Parvanov is not just a manifestation of his support for the government. It has a pre-history of its own and is important for the creation of the public image of the Ataka leader himself. It is sufficient to remember that in 1994 Parvanov used to stand for the nationalist-populist theses that turned Siderov into an emblematic figure much later.

On the other hand, Ataka is permanently connected with Russia's positions. This is the characteristic shift which prevents Ataka from establishing itself as a chauvinistic or conservative nationalist formation - it is anti-American, radically anti-Turkish, and negative towards the model of United Europe but it has always supported the ideology of Pan-Slavism and Russian model of Orthodoxy as a basis for its political position.

The clash on the field of defending Bulgaria's national interests in accord with the Russian strategic interests will always generate tension between Parvanov and Siderov. In turn, through its support for GERB, Ataka has the chance to gain legitimacy as part of the parliamentary majority, which gives it the chance to retreat gradually from the radical xenophobic image which was useful for it during its initial positioning.

Do you believe that Boyko Borisov and GERB are purposefully seeking to change Bulgaria's form of government towards a presidential republic, or is that just one of the possible scenarios? What would be necessary for such a change - a successful term and therefore immense popularity of the government, or its collapse bringing about a "crisis"?

I don't think that there is a full-scale strategic project aimed at realizing a constitutional change of such proportions. For the time being, it seems that this is not a very likely scenario; its being put forth has tactical importance. In case of a successful mandate which ends in political agreement for the creation of new Constitution, the scenario for changing the form of government will be placed on the public agenda but I don't think that Borisov will favor such a development in the near future.

In the event of a serious government or even parliamentary crisis within the coming year (which seems highly unlikely!), it would rather be political groups centered around the current President, Georgi Parvanov, who would promote such a scenario. In any case, both scenarios will have considerable differences and a principally different political profile.

What are the public attitudes towards the idea for establishing a presidential republic put forth by former President, Zhelyu Zhelev (1990-1997)?

This is a constitutional matter. Under the present Constitution, the powers of the President are in contradiction with his majority election. It must be decided whether to keep the majority election system and to structure the presidential powers under the presidential republic model, or to keep the President's current status and to change the way of election - by the Parliament instead of by the people. Until this contradiction is resolved - having a popularly elected President with minor powers - the arguments around the status of the President in our parliamentary republic will continue to stray from the actual point of the political debate.

The public attitudes on this topic have always been part of the wider political model of a type of a personal regime. The lack of adequate parliamentary democracy as well as of an established monarchial tradition in Bulgaria has always led to the contradictory combination of declared preferences for the representative parliamentary form of government, and some type of a personal regime, which can concentrate power and responsibility within one figure.

Actually, this is also the political heritage of the so called "developed socialism" which affirmed the authoritarian type of government personified by Todor Zhivkov (Bulgaria's communist dictator - 1956-1989 - editor's note). Expectations for a strong person will continue to be projected along this political line at least during the next 10-15 years; the strong person will continue to be seen as an effective guarantee of the state - and at the same time - as a common justification for the lack of civil initiative. At least on the surface, the support for a potential presidential republic seems similar to the declarations in favor of a majority election system but in reality this support is still not enough in order to achieve such a radical political change.

In your view, which form of government is more appropriate and better for Bulgaria - parliamentary or presidential republic?

The vast majority of the Bulgarian citizens remain deeply unaware of the very principle of separation of powers. Instead of guarantees for civil freedom, the majority of the Bulgarians see the separation of powers as a prerequisite for a chaotic and weak government which is traditionally associated with practically unlimited opportunities for political corruption.

At the same time, concentrating power with one person with today's development of democracy in Bulgaria could bring the country before the threat of establishing a mild or more tangible authoritarian regime. In my view, in the long run, the parliamentary democracy is the political system, which satisfies to the greatest extent the opportunities for development and guarantees of the freedom, justice, and security of the Bulgarian citizens.

The presidential republic will have wide popular support only at the beginning of its existence while the parliamentary republic has the opportunity to affirm its significance and increase its effectiveness over a long period of time.

Can GERB be defined as a Bulgarian political party of the Gaullist type? If yes, what does that mean for the country as types of policies that can be expected from the ruling party?

Yes, the GERB party definitely has certain features bringing it close to the Gaullist political tradition. Most of all, this means center-right policies with a strong emphasis on the national cause, encouraging the national industries and the independence of the country in the realm of international relations. If this trend is preserved and expanded, such policies by definition require a relative centralization of the decision-making process, and a certain denigration of the regional and local development in favor of the state government.

This political model has traditionally been criticized as lacking in social awareness and usually proves to be more incapable of adapting to the accelerating processes of social transformation. At the same, at least in the present moment, it seems acceptable for Bulgaria at least until it manages to affirm the authority of the state institutions, and while the present trust and respect for the personality of Boyko Borisov exist.

Such a regime cannot function efficiently and be sustained permanently if case of a lack of a political figure who can be the focus of the public expectations for sustainability and predictability.

How would you forecast the development of the processes within the Bulgarian Socialist Party? Is former Prime Minister, Sergey Stanishev, going to remain the leader of the party after the congress in October 2009? Do the Socialists have the potential to win the Mayor elections in Sofia in November?

The creation of a modern, European left in Bulgaria is yet to happen. Unlike the right-wing parties, which entered their "crises of normalization" ten years ago, the BSP has mobilized its entire energy to resist the normalization processes. The only thing that today keeps together communists, social democrats, and socialists in the BSP-led Coalition for Bulgaria is their common political genesis and their fear of isolation.

Regardless of the desire or readiness of the BSP, especially after completing the previous government term, it can no longer postpone its own political change. Sergey Stanishev has neither the political support, nor the political authority which would allow him, if he retains the Chair position, to mitigate BSP's clash with reality. What is more, his reelection would most probably accelerate the centrifugal trends among the mechanical confluence of corporate and clan interests that have been choosing to survive together so far.

BSP's failure in Sofia is inevitable but even this prospect did not prevent Stanishev from resisting one of the best possible nominations of the Socialists in Sofia in the face of Georgi Kadiev. The splitting off of one or two communist formations from the BSP-led Coalition for Bulgaria is imminent. It seems possible that the President Parvanov will be willing to commit himself to paving the way for a possible social-democratic formation.

The green parties in turn will most likely decide to exit the Coalition for Bulgaria where they are in BSP's shadow, and they will also be joined by the groups of the left agrarians who were almost totally deprived of there identity in the recent years. The change is inevitable but the continuous resistance to it will lead to a long and painful process of normalization in the left, which will probably require more time and effort than the structuring of the political right in Bulgaria.

 

We need your support so Novinite.com can keep delivering news and information about Bulgaria! Thank you!